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COMMENTS
The Twenty-First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause: What Rationale
Supports Bacchus Imports?
Introduction
The Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution was
enacted primarily to repeal the Eighteenth Amendment's mandate of na-
tional prohibition.' Beyond merely repealing the Eighteenth Amend-
ment, however, Section Two of the Twenty-first Amendment included a
broad grant of power to the states to regulate the importation and con-
sumption of liquor.2 In the rush to repeal prohibition,' the drafters of
the Amendment did not leave a clear record of their intent in including
Section Two.4 As a result, courts have never gleaned a single purpose
underlying Section Two that could guide the resolution of conflicts be-
tween Section Two and other constitutional provisions.
States have often used Section Two to assert power over liquor im-
portation in a manner that directly conflicts with the Commerce Clause.5
In the cases arising out of these conflicts, the United States Supreme
Court has never taken a consistent position on the question of the rela-
tionship between the Section Two grant of power and the Commerce
Clause. Over time the Court has moved from recognizing an unqualified
1. The Twenty-first Amendment, section 1 provides: "The eighteenth article of amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI,
§ 1.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 reads: "The transportation or importation into any
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
3. The Twenty-first Amendment was proposed by Congress on February 20, 1933, and
ratification was completed by December 5, 1933. See generally Levine, The Birth ofAmerican
Alcohol Control: Prohibition, the Power Elite, and the Problem of Lawlessness, CONTEMP.
DRUG PROBLEMS 63, 63-68 (Spring 1985). During their respective conventions in 1932, both
major political parties had included in their platforms a call to repeal prohibition. Id. at 80-8 1;
76 CONG. REc. 4139 (1933) (remarks of Senator Blaine).
4. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
5. U.S. CONST. article I, § 8, clause 3 provides in part: "The Congress shall have Power
[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." See infra notes
104-150 and accompanying text.
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state power over liquor,6 to limiting the scope of Section Two by increas-
ingly narrow interpretations of its language,7 to declaring in Bacchus Im-
ports, Ltd. v. Dias' that Section Two does not permit a state to
discriminate against interstate commerce.
While Bacchus clearly established a Commerce Clause limitation on
the states' Section Two power, the reasoning of the decision is unsatisfac-
tory. The majority opinion drew on precedents in which the Commerce
Clause has limited state power at the periphery of Section Two and as-
serted that these precedents limit the core power of states under Section
Two.9 Although this analysis is irreconcilable with earlier Court deci-
sions, the Bacchus majority failed to overrule those decisions or to distin-
guish them from Bacchus.10  The dissenting opinion, while remaining
faithful to the earlier precedents, refused to consider the possibility that
the core power of Section Two may be limited to prevent discrimination
against interstate commerce. 1
Both Bacchus opinions assumed that the circumstances surrounding
adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment were too ambiguous to help
resolve the issue of whether Section Two empowers a state to protect its
own liquor industry from out of state competition. This Comment, how-
ever, analyzes the history of the Amendment and constructs an interpre-
tation of Section Two which reconciles the need to prevent economic
warfare among the states-the driving force behind the majority opin-
ion-with the core powers of Section Two.
This Comment first examines the facts and opinions in Bacchus.
Next it discusses the strong condemnation of discrimination against in-
terstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. It then analyzes the cir-
cumstances in which Section Two was adopted in order to provide a
context within which to interpret the provision. The Comment then re-
views the development of the Court's analysis of Section Two power and
details the Court's efforts to advance the strong national interest in the
free flow of interstate commerce by progressively narrowing its reading
of the language of Section Two. Against this, the Comment contrasts the
Court's willingness in Bacchus to go beyond the four corners of Section
Two to discern its "central purpose." Finally, the Comment provides an
analysis based on the history of state prohibition efforts and the circum-
6. See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 111-150 and accompanying text.
8. 104 S. Ct. 3049 (1984).
9. 104 S. Ct. at 3058; for a discussion of the "peripheral" regulation decisions, see infra
notes 127-142 and accompanying text.
10. See 104 S. Ct. at 3057-59. The Bacchus Court acknowledged the early decisions that
contradicted its holding, id. at 3057 n.13, but dismissed them, stating, "It is by now clear that
the Amendment did not entirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit
of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 3058.
11. See 104 S. Ct. at 3049, 3061-64 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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stances surrounding adoption of the Twenty-first Amendment that may
provide a more satisfactory rationale for the decision in Bacchus.
I. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias
A. The Facts
In 1939, the state of Hawaii imposed an excise tax on wholesale
liquor sales for the purpose of recouping the costs of industry regulation
and additional police services attributable to the consumption of liquor.
Originally, the tax applied equally to both imported and locally produced
alcoholic beverages. Subsequently, however, in an effort to nurture the
developing domestic liquor industry, the Hawaii legislature established
several exemptions from the tax. Okolehao, a brandy distilled from the
root of the Hawaiian ti plant, 2 was exempted from May 17, 1971, until
June 20, 1981. Additionally, a local pineapple wine was exempted from
May 17, 1976, until June 30, 1981.13
Several liquor wholesalers who imported alcohol into Hawaii and
sold it to licensed retailers sued to recover approximately $45 million in
taxes they had paid under protest. In part, the wholesalers claimed that
the tax was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 14 Both
the state Tax Appeal Court and the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the
Commerce Clause claim.' 5 The Hawaii Supreme Court reasoned that
there was no discrimination against interstate commerce because "inci-
dence of the tax here is on wholesalers of liquor in Hawaii and the ulti-
mate burden is borne by consumers in Hawaii." 16 The United States
Supreme Court reversed.
B. The Decisions
Writing for the majority, Justice White addressed and disposed of
Hawaii's contention that its liquor tax did not violate the Commerce
Clause.17 Citing a long history of commerce clause jurisprudence, Jus-
12. In re Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 65 Hawaii 566, 569 n.7, 656 P.2d 724, 727 n.7 (1982).
13. HAwAn REv. STAT. §§ 244-44(6), (7) (1976).
14. The court in In re Bacchus also dealt with claims by the liquor wholesalers that the
tax exemption at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause and the entire tax violated the
Export-Import Clause insofar as it impacted on imports of foreign liquor. The court disposed
of the equal protection claim on the basis that the tax exemption was rationally related to the
legitimate state objective of fostering domestic industry. In re Bacchus, 65 Hawaii at 573-74,
656 P.2d at 730. The court rejected the export-import clause claim on the basis that no viola-
tion had occurred due to the fact that the tax was imposed on all local sales and uses of liquor
regardless of its point of origin. I. at 575-78, 656 P.2d at 731-33. The Supreme Court based
its decision on appeal on commerce clause grounds and did not examine the merits of either
the equal protection claim or the export-import clause claim.
15. 65 Hawaii at 569, 582, 656 P.2d at 727, 735.
16. Id. at 581, 656 P.2d at 734.
17. Bacchus, 104 S. Ct. at 3056-57.
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tice White stressed the Court's abhorrence of disciminatory measures
designed to confer a commercial advantage on domestically produced
goods and services at the expense of interstate commerce.18
The majority found the state's argument that the exempted products
were not in competition with articles of interstate commerce transparent.
Justice White pointed out that the original legislative justification for the
exemption-fostering the development of the okolehao and pineapple
wine industries by encouraging increased consumption-assumed direct
competition between local and imported liquor. 9 Justice White found
Hawaii's tax exemption for locally produced liquor to be clearly discrimi-
natory against interstate commerce in purpose and effect, in direct viola-
tion of settled commerce clause principles.20
The Court then turned to the state's defense, first raised on appeal,
that the tax exemption fell within the protection of Section Two.2' Jus-
tice White rejected this argument, which he saw as based on early deci-
sions of the Court which construed Section Two as a grant of plenary
power to the states to regulate liquor.22 He reviewed more recent deci-
sions of the Court and reasoned that they support the proposition that
the Commerce Clause forbids restraints on the interstate liquor trade
which go beyond Section Two's "central purpose".23 While leaving the
exact dimension of the central purpose undefined, he concluded that
given the strong federal interest in preventing economic Balkanization,
"one thing is certain: The central purpose of the provision was not to
empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to
competition."24
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that Justice White's decision was a
complete break with the Court's prior interpretation of Section Two.
Justice Stevens read Section Two as explicitly granting states the power
to burden interstate commerce in liquor even in a discriminatory fash-
18. Id. at 3055. The Court noted that a finding that state legislation effects "economic
protectionism" of domestically produced goods or services may be made on the basis of either
discriminatory intent or discriminatory effect. Id.
19. Id. at 3055-56 (quoting In re Bacchus Imports Ltd., 65 Hawaii 566, 573-74, 656 P.2d
724, 730 (1982): "'The legislature's reason for exempting "ti root okolehao" from the "alco-
hol tax" was to "encourage and promote the establishment of a new industry," S.L.H. 1960, c.
26; Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 87, in 1960 Senate Journal, at 224, and the exemption of
"fruit wine manufactured in the State from products grown in the State" was intended "to
help" in stimulating "the local fruit wine industry." S.L.H. 1976, c. 39, Sen. Stand. Comm.
Rep. No. 408-76, in 1976 Senate Journal, at 1056.' ").
20. Bacchus, 104 S. Ct. at 3056 ("Consequently, as long as there is some competition
between the locally produced exempt products and non-exempt products from outside the
State, there is a discriminatory effect.").
21. 104 S. Ct. at 3057-59; see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
22. 104 S. Ct. at 3057, n.13.
23. Id. at 3058.
24. Id. at 3058.
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ion.25 He rejected Justice White's assertion that more recent decisions of
the Court had qualified the early interpretation of Section Two as a
broad grant of power.26 Justice Stevens distinguished the recent decisions
on factual grounds and argued that those cases could only be read to
have specifically recognized a discriminatory liquor taxing scheme as one
of the core powers conferred on states by Section Two. Thus he con-
cluded that Section Two shields the Hawaiian scheme from commerce
clause constraints.27
II. The Commerce Clause and Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce
While the Commerce Clause affirmatively grants power to Congress
to regulate interstate commerce, "nowhere does it explicitly limit state
interference with interstate commerce."28 The development of the so-
called "dormant" Commerce Clause doctrine, limiting state power over
commerce even in the absence of congressional action, springs from the
Constitution's "negative implications."29 This interpretation of the
"great silences of the Constitution"3 reflects the strong policy considera-
tions favoring the free flow of interstate commerce. As Justice Douglas
observed,
The Commerce Clause has a negative as well as a positive aspect.
The Clause not only serves to augment federal authority. By its
own force it also cuts down the power of the constituent State in its
exercise of what normally would be a part of its residual police
power.31
As the Court noted in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,32 the "commercial
warfare between states, 33 under the Articles of Confederation was
largely responsible for the calling of the first Constitutional Convention,
where the framers decided to "centralize regulation of commerce among
the states."34
25. Id. at 3062.
26. Id. at 3062-64.
27. Id. at 3064.
28. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 320 (1979).
29. Id.
30. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949) (Jackson, J.).
31. W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 222 (1956).
32. 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (overturning New York's refusal to grant an operating license to a
Massachusetts dairy because it might divert milk to out of state consumers).
33. 336 U.S. at 533.
34. Id. at 534; see M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 (1969) (quoting M. FAR-
RAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1913, 1962) "'The
Americans were an agricultural and a trading people. Interference with the arteries of com-
merce was cutting off the very life-blood of the nation and something had to be done.' "); see
also B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 239
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Since the seminal decision in Gibbons v. Ogden, 35 the Court has rec-
ognized the superiority of the federal interest in promoting interstate
commerce over competing state interests. In Gibbons, Chief Justice Mar-
shall took a broad view of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause
to regulate all "commerce which concerns more States than one. "36
Under this view, no area of interstate commerce is reserved for exclusive
state control.37 Although states retain no exclusive power over interstate
commerce, they may act in ways that affect interstate commerce under
their police powers. For instance, under its police powers a state may
encourage the development of domestic industry. The Commerce
Clause, however, "stands as a limitation on the means by which a State
can constitutionally seek to achieve that goal."38
The Commerce Clause limitations on the exercise of states' police
powers clearly prohibit a state from discriminating against interstate
commerce in order to aid a developing industry. In Walling v. Michi-
gan,39 the Court struck down a state law imposing a sales tax on liquor
produced outside of the state. According to the Court, the discrimina-
tory tax was a "restraint of commerce among the States" and a "usurpa-
tion of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Congress of the
United States."'4 More recently, in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax
Commission,41 the Court invalidated New York's imposition of a higher
transfer tax on securities traded outside of the state than on those traded
within the state. The Court stated that "no State may discriminatorily
tax the products manufactured or the business operations performed in
any other State" for the purpose of encouraging domestic development.4'
It has become a truism that the Commerce Clause limits the power
of states to discriminate against interstate commerce by selective taxa-
(1977) ("Thus, the generating source of the Constitution lay in the rising volume of restraints
upon commerce before which the Confederation had been impotent.").
35. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
36. Id. at 194.
37. Id. at 198-200.
38. Bacchus, 104 S. Ct. at 3056; M. FORKOSCH, supra note 34, at 355 ("Where the state's
power is exerted against interstate commerce so as to protect its industries or people from
national competition then the concept of a great American free trade market is destroyed.");
see also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (referring to barrier to interstate
commerce erected by the state to protect local industry: "This [the state] cannot do, even in
the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reason-
able nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are
available.").
39. 116 U.S. 446 (1886).
40. Id. at 455.
41. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
42. Id. at 337.
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tion.43 This doctrine reflects more than a policy of promoting economic
efficiency among the states; it serves also to protect the politically power-
less residents of one state from the abusive economic legislation of an-
other state. As John Hart Ely has noted, "by constitutionally tying the
fate of outsiders to the fate of those possessing political power, the fram-
ers insured that their interests would be well looked after."'  Even those
who generally may disapprove of federal judicial intervention into state
legislative prerogatives "tend to support a relatively active role for the
federal judiciary 'when the centrifugal, isolating or hostile forces of local-ism are manifested in state legislation.' "45 This expansive doctrine
brings the Commerce Clause into direct conflict with Section Two of the
Twenty-first Amendment.
III. The Twenty-First Amendment and the
Enigma of Section Two
The primary purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment was to repeal
the Eighteenth Amendment." The political realities surrounding pas-
sage of the repeal amendment required that states wishing to remain
dry47 retain the power to do so. Before the adoption of national prohibi-
tion, judicial decisions based on the Commerce Clause had emasculated
the efforts of dry states to restrict the importation of liquor for consump-
tion.48 Congress had aided state efforts by passing the Wilson Act49 and
43. See eg., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876) (striking down a license levy imposed
on all peddlers dealing in goods which were not produced in the state); B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 34, at 290.
44. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 83 (1980); see also Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (upholding law prohibiting oil producers and refiners from
operating retail gas stations even though it affected out of state companies exclusively, holding
that burden was accidental and did not affect all out of state companies selling gas in
Maryland).
45. L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 319 (quoting Brown, The Open Economy: Mr. Justice
Frankfurter and the Position of the Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1957)).
46. See supra note I and accompanying text.
47. As used in this Comment, the term "dry states" refers to those states which imposed
their own internal prohibitions of intoxicating liquors.
48. See, eg., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (holding that a "subject matter" such
as "commerce among the states" that is placed under Congress' exclusive authority by the
Constitution is not within the realm of the state police power unless Congress has acted to
place it there); see also 76 CONG. REC. 4170 (1933) (remarks of Senator Borah, observing that
early attempts at state prohibition had been defeated by constitutional litigation mounted by
liquor interests). See infra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
49. Wilson Act, 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1982) provides in pertinent part that
[a]ll... intoxicating liquors ... transported into any State ... for use, consumption,
sale or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such State... be subject to the operation
and effect of the laws of such State ... enacted in the exercise of its police powers...
and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original
packages or otherwise.
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the Webb-Kenyon Act,5" which vested in states the power to regulate
liquor traffic free from the constraints of the Commerce Clause. But be-
cause this statutory solution was vulnerable to constitutional attack and
to congressional repeal, the drafters of Section Two sought to secure the
power of states to remain dry by writing it into the Constitution.
1. Prohibition Before the Eighteenth Amendment
Long before the movement toward national prohibition began, indi-
vidual states attempted to prohibit the importation and consumption of
liquor within their boundaries. These efforts were based on the states'
police powers recognized in the License Cases of 1847.1 Upholding a
state law requiring a license to sell liquor against a Commerce Clause
challenge, the Court stated, "The law is not a revenue act, but a police
measure .... The health laws, quarantine laws, ballast laws, etc., prove
that the police power may be extended to imports and importers, if the
public safety or welfare demands it."52
Subsequently, in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. 3
the Court recognized limits on the exercise of the states' police power
with respect to articles in interstate commerce. Bowman involved a chal-
lenge to an Iowa law which furthered the state's policy of prohibition by
essentially forbidding the importation of liquor.5 4 The Bowman Court
ruled that a state could not regulate liquor, even as part of a general
prohibition, until after importation, when the liquor has been "mingled
with and become a part of the general property of the State."1
55
In response to the devastating effect Bowman had on its prohibition
efforts, Iowa amended its general prohibition law to permit seizure of
imported liquor after entry into the state. The case of Leisy v. Hardin56
arose when a liquor importer brought a Commerce Clause challenge to
this law because his stock was seized after physical arrival within the
state, but before the original packaging had been broken. The Leisy
Court held that a state may not forbid the first sale of liquor while it is in
50. Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1982), provides in relevant part: "[I]ntoxicating
liquors or liquids transported into any State ... for use, consumption, sale or storage therein,
shall upon arrival... be subject to the laws of such State... and shall not be exempt there-
from by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise."
51. License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
52. Id. at 536.
53. 125 U.S. 465 (1888).
54. Id. at 469-70.
55. Id. at 507-08 (Field, J., concurring). But note that the decision recognized an excep-
tion to this for purposes of the protection of the public through inspection and quarantine as
reasonably necessary. Id. at 498.
56. 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (the Iowa law functioned as a total prohibition and would apply
to any sale of intoxicating liquor within the state, even to the first sale of liquor in its original
packaging).
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the original package in which it was shipped from another state.5 7 The
Court reasoned that liquor is a legitimate article of commerce and thus is
protected just as any other article in interstate commerce.
58
Leisy, however, contained dicta which invited congressional action
to aid dry states by declaring that states may not exclude articles from
commerce "in the absence of congressional permission."59 Congress re-
sponded by passing the Wilson Act several months after Leisy.6° The
Act provided that state prohibition laws should apply to imported liquor
in its original packaging "to the same extent as though such ... liquors
had been produced in such state."61 The Court affirmed the constitution-
ality of this statute in In re Rahrer,62 involving a prohibition law in Kan-
sas. The Rahrer Court established that Congress may, under its
commerce power, divest imported liquor of its interstate commerce char-
acter and permit state regulation at a time earlier than would ordinarily
be permissible.6"
The Court, however, restricted the scope of the Wilson Act in
Rhodes v. Iowa.1 The Rhodes Court narrowly construed the words
"upon arrival" in the Act65 to prevent a state from siezing liquor stored
in a freight warehouse.66 The Court reasoned that the state's power to
regulate should not attach until the "termination of the interstate com-
merce shipment., 67 To hold otherwise, the Court maintained, would
give state prohibition laws extraterritorial operation because "the inevita-
ble consequence of allowing a state law to forbid interstate shipments of
merchandise would be to destroy the right to contract beyond the limits
57. Id. at 124-25.
58. Id. at 116. The Court responded to the argument that the state could use its quaran-
tine power against liquor imports:
But it must be remembered that disease, pestilence and pauperism are not subjects of
commerce, although sometimes among its attendant evils.... But spirits and dis-
tilled liquors are universally admitted to be subjects of ownership and property, and
are therefore subjects of exchange, barter and traffic, like any other commodity in
which a right of property exists.
Id.
59. Id. at 124-25.
60. See, ag., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 552-53 (1891) (argument of petitioner observed
that the aid of Congress was invoked in order to grant the states the power to bring the inter-
state commerce in liquor within their jurisdiction).
61. Wilson Act, supra note 49.
62. 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
63. Id. at 562. The Court did not refer to this as a grant of power to the states, rather it
was simply the removal of an "impediment to the enforcement of the state laws in respect to
imported packages in their original condition, created by the absence of a specific utterance on
its part." Id. at 564.
64. 170 U.S. 412 (1898) (where the state seized liquor being held in a railroad freight
warehouse pending shipment to the ultimate consignee).
65. See supra note 49.
66. Rhodes, 170 U.S. at 421-26.
67. Id. at 423.
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of the State for such shipments." 68 The Rhodes Court found this "inevi-
table consequence" to be beyond Congress' intent.69
Rhodes created a new problem for states attempting to enforce pro-
hibition: they could not prohibit liquor sales by mail order on direct
consignment to the ultimate consumer.70 Congress responded to this di-
lemma by passing the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913, which prohibited the
importation of liquor into any state with the intent to receive, possess,
sell, or use it in violation of that state's laws.71 The Court upheld this
Act against a commerce clause challenge in Clark Distilling Co. v. West-
ern Maryland Railway Co.72 The Clark Distilling Court saw the Webb-
Kenyon Act as legislation
simply [extending] that which was done by the Wilson Act; that is
to say, its purpose was to prevent the immunity characteristic of
interstate commerce from being used to permit the receipt of liquor
through such commerce in States contrary to their laws ... so as to
cause the prohibitions of the [state] law against shipment, receipt
and possession to be applicable and controlling ....
The Court reasoned that the power of Congress to enact the Webb-Ken-
yon Act was sustainable on the same basis as that on which the Wilson
Act had been upheld in In re Rahrer.74
Clark Distilling established the principle that Congress can prevent
an individual in one state from using the instrumentalities of interstate
68. Id. at 422.
69. Id. at 426. "We think that interpreting the statute by the light of all of its provisions,
it was not intended to and did not cause the power of the State to attach to an interstate
commerce shipment, whilst the merchandise was in transit under such shipment, and until its
arrival at the point of destination and delivery there to consignee." Id.
70. Id. at 415-16 (although the Court recognized that this was a more convenient way for
the states to enforce prohibition laws).
71. See supra note 50.
72. 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (upholding the West Virginia prohibition law, which forbade
common carriers from carrying intoxicating liquors intended for personal use into the state).
The Clark Distilling Court, however, was divided in upholding the Webb-Kenyon Act. Seven
justices voted to uphold the Act while two dissented. Id. at 332 (Holmes and Van Devanter,
JJ., dissenting). This division would cause concern for dry states during debate on the Twenty-
first Amendment that the Court could strike down a statutory grant of the power to restrict
the importation and consumption of liquor to the states. See infra notes 83-85 and accompa-
nying text.
73. 242 U.S. at 324.
74. Id. at 330.
As the power to regulate which was manifested in the Wilson Act, and that which
was exerted in enacting the Webb-Kenyon Law, are essentially identical, the one
being but a larger degree of exertion of the identical power which was brought into
play in the other, we are unable to understand upon what principle we could hold
that the one was not a regulation without holding that the other had the same infir-
mity, a result which, as we have previously said, would reverse Leisy v. Hardin and
overthrow the many adjudications of this court sustaining the Wilson Act. Id.
[Vol. 13:361
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commerce to violate the prohibition laws of another state. 75  Signifi-
cantly, Clark Distilling, Rhodes, and In re Rahrer each involved congres-
sional efforts to aid states in enforcing total prohibitions on liquor under
their police powers for purposes of promoting "'the preservation of the
morals, the health, or safety of the community.' ,76 None of these cases
stood for the proposition that states without prohibition policies could
burden interstate commerce in order to aid a domestic liquor industry.77
This distinction, which relates to Congress' statutory protections for
state prohibition efforts, is crucial to placing the subsequent Section Two
grant of power in the proper context.
2. Prohibition and Repeal
Passage of the Eighteenth Amendment 7 in 1919 created national
prohibition and temporarily resolved the issue of state liquor regulation.
The "noble experiment" of the Eighteenth Amendment, however, be-
came a resounding failure.79 The regular, almost institutionalized defi-
ance of the Amendment, coupled with the hardships of the Depression,
created fears that the populace might develop a general disrespect for law
and order that could threaten property interests.8" In addition, prohibi-
tion foreclosed the possibility of collecting much needed tax revenues
from commerce in liquor.81 Corporate interests, which originally had
backed prohibition, came to support repeal. 82 The stage was set for
75. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 280 ("The decisions sustaining the Wilson and
Webb-Kenyon Acts gave to state regulatory power a scope previously denied to it on the basis
of the Commerce Clause.").
76. M. FoRKoscH, supra note 34, at 254 (quoting from the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504, 592 (1847)).
77. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 34, at 276; see, eg., Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238
U.S. 190 (1915) (the intent of the Webb-Kenyon Act was to render state liquor prohibitions
effective when liquor imported into state in violation of its laws).
78. The Eighteenth Amendment, section 1 provided: "After one year from the ratifica-
tion of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the
importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory
subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST.
amend XVIII, § I (adopted in 1919, repealed in 1933).
79. See generally Levine, supra note 3, at 69-80.
80. Id. at 76-77 (referring to the report of the National Commission on Law Observance
and Enforcement (the "Wickersham" Commission) which warned that the widespread con-
tempt for the policy of prohibition was having a serious effect on the attitudes of the working
class towards law and order in general); id. at 70-74 (one AFL leader was quoted in Senate
hearings in January 1932 as saying: "Beer would have a decidedly soothing tendency on the
present day mental attitude of the working men .... It would do a great deal to change their
mental attitude on economic conditions.").
81. Id. at 109 n.1 (discussing the importance of the economic argument (increased tax
revenues from a revitalized and legitimized liquor industry) for securing support for repeal
during the height of the Depression).
82. Id. at 78-79 (quoting from a letter by John D. Rockefeller Jr. stating that after all of
his long years of support for prohibition he had come to believe that the benefits of prohibition
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repeal.
For a repeal amendment to have any chance of success, the support
of the dry states was necessary.83 Thus, as a purely political matter, sup-
porters of repeal had to assure dry states that they would retain the
power to maintain state-wide prohibition free from the constraints of the
Commerce Clause. As the repeal resolution's floor leader, Senator
Blaine, stated:
I am opposed to the dry States interfering with the so-called wet
States in connection with this question of intoxicating liquors; and
so, by the same token, I am willing to grant to the dry States full
measure of protection, and thus prohibit the wet States from inter-
fering in their internal affairs respecting the control of intoxicating
liquors.8 4
The dry states were concerned that federal statutory protection of
their power to remain dry would be inadequate. This concern stemmed
from two fears: (1) that the holdings in In re Rahrer and Clark Distil-
ling, which supported Congress' power to divest goods of their interstate
character and permit state regulation, might be overruled and (2) that an
act of Congress could be repealed by Congress. The method proposed to
ensure adequate protection for the dry states' interests was to elevate the
existing shield of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts to the constitu-
tional level.8" Accordingly, Section Two was included in the proposed
Twenty-first Amendment and was adopted within ten months.86
The joint repeal resolution, as originally drafted in the Senate, also
contained a third section which would have conferred concurrent power
on the federal government to regulate liquor consumed on the premises
where it was sold.8 7 Under their police powers, states have power to
regulate the manufacture and distribution of liquor within their bor-
ders.88 The federal government, however, absent an explicit grant such
as Section Three of the Eighteenth Amendment, does not possess this
power.9 The wording of proposed Section Three to the Twenty-first
"'are more than outweighed by the evils that have developed and flourished since its adop-
tion.'" Rockefeller thought that prohibition had engendered a lack of respect for the law.).
83. Levine, supra note 3, at 82 (the Twenty-first Amendment was ratified on December 5,
1933 when the stalwart dry state Utah became the thirty-sixth state to vote for repeal).
84. 76 CONG. REc. 4141 (1933) (remarks of Senator Blaine).
85. Id. See also id. at 4170 (1933) (remarks of Senator Borah, referring to the Wilson and
Webb-Kenyon Acts, "it never has become a settled policy.., of the Congress and, it seems to
me, could not be accepted as a sufficient protection to the dry States").
86. See supra note 3.
87. For the text of the proposed Section Three see infra note 96.
88. See supra notes 38 & 52 and accompanying text.
89. 76 CONG. REc. 4155 (1933) (remarks of Senator Walsh, referring to proposed Section
Three, "We simply say that the Congress shall have concurrent power with the States; that is
to say, the States have the power, and we give the power also to the Congress."); see text of
Section Three infra note 96.
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Amendment was designed to grant regulatory power over liquor to the
federal government to deal with one particular, though politically-
charged aspect of the liquor trade: the saloon. The possibility that sa-
loons would return after repeal was widely criticized, both inside and
outside of Congress. 90 As one senator remarked, "Everyone who advo-
cated repeal of the eighteenth amendment always prefaced his remarks
with the statement, 'We do not want the saloon back. Nobody wants the
saloon back.' ,91
While the purpose of Section Three won general approval, its vice
was that it retained the shortcomings of the Eighteenth Amendment-
federal control over a problem which many viewed to be essentially local
in nature.92 Thus it was defeated in Congress.93
3. The Absolutist and Federalist Interpretations of the Legislative History
Interpretations of the meaning of Section Two generally adopt one
of two conflicting views which may be labeled "absolutist" 94 and "feder-
alist."9' The absolutist view holds that Section Two was intended to be a
grant of plenary power to the states to regulate liquor within their bor-
ders. Supporters of this view point to the fact that proposed Section
Three of the Amendment, providing for concurrent federal and state ju-
risdiction over liquor consumed in taverns and bars, was defeated during
congressional debate.96 Additionally, several Senators made statements
supporting the absolutist view. Speaking against concurrent federal
power, one Senator contended, "[L]et the people of each State deal with
that subject, and they will do it more effectively and more successfully
90. Levine, supra note 3, at 101; 76 CONG. REc. 4177 (1933) (excerpt from Liberty Maga-
zine, Jan. 21, 1933, "The open saloon was a destructive force of great magnitude. It catered to
human depravity....").
91. 76 CONG. REc. 4161 (1933) (remarks of Senator Norris).
92. See, e.g., 76 CONG. REc. 4145 (1933) (remarks of Senator Wagner, referring to pro-
posed Section Three as a means of ensuring against the return of the saloon, "It flies in the
face of reason and experience. If the Federal Government failed to discharge that responsibil-
ity under the all-embracing prohibition of the eighteenth amendment, what folly is it which
prompts anyone to believe that it can discharge it under the milder language of the pending
resolution? The inevitable consequence of section 3 will be that the liquor question will con-
tinue to bedevil national politics.").
93. 76 CONG. R~c. 4179 (1933) (vote to strike Section Three from the text of the pro-
posed Twenty-first Amendment).
94. Note, The Effect of the Twenty-First Amendment on State Authority to Control Intoxi-
cating Liquors, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1578, 1579-80 (1975) (the term "absolutist" is used to
describe those who support a literal reading of Section Two).
95. Case Note, Federal District Court Exempts Interstate Rail Carrier From State Open
Saloon Prohibition, 6 CREIGHTON L. REV. 249 (1972) (the term "federalist" is used to denote
those who support a strictly limited reading of Section Two as against the Commerce Clause).
96. As originally proposed, the Twenty-first Amendment included Section Three which
read: "Congress shall have concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquors to be drunk on the premises where sold." 76 CONG. R~c. 4138 (1933).
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than the Federal Government has done, because it is not the business of
the Federal Government., 97  Finally, support for the absolutist view
comes from the language of Section Two itself: the provision contains no
reference to any external constitutional limitations.9"
On the other hand, the federalist interpretation holds that Section
Two was enacted solely to allow dry states to remain dry. Under this
view, the federal government cannot interfere with dry states' prohibi-
tions of liquor imports, but retains power over liquor in interstate com-
merce.99 It was with this understanding that several Senators supported
Section Two."° In the words of one Senator, Section Two was simply a
"restatement of the Webb-Kenyon law, already on the law books, which
would write into the Constitution the right of the dry States to have Fed-
eral protection against the importation of liquor." 101
While the drafters' deliberations on Section Two are clearly re-
corded, the records of the state ratifying conventions are much less satis-
factory. In many instances the records of the conventions reveal no
details whatsoever of the debates. 0 2 Apparently, the haste and festivity
of the movement toward repeal obscured the debates in the states regard-
ing the potential legal ramifications of Section Two.0 3
4. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Section Two
a. The Absolutist Decisions
The first Supreme Court decisions to interpret Section Two adopted
the absolutist view toward the conflicts between state regulation of liquor
and the Commerce Clause. In State Board of Equalization v. Young's
Market,1" the Court upheld a $500 fee for the privilege of importing
beer into California. A group of wholesalers challenged the fee on the
grounds that it violated both the Commerce Clause and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. The federal district court ruled for the plaintiffs after a
cursory analysis of the Twenty-first Amendment. 10 5
97. Id. at 4146 (remarks of Senator Wagner). But note that the Senator was referring
specifically to the issue raised by Section Three of concurrent regulation of liquor dispensed in
saloons.
98. See supra note 2.
99. See Note, supra note 94, at 1580.
100. 76 CONG. REc. 4168 (1933) (remarks of Senator Fess: "In other words, the second
section of the joint resolution that is now before us is designed to permit the Federal authority
to assist the States that want to be dry to remain dry.").
101. Id. at 4228.
102. E. BROWN, RATIFICATION OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Part 1) (1970) (records of the state ratification conventions).
103. Id. at 5; see also 76 CONG. REC. 4164 (1933) (remarks of Senator Dickinson: "It was
speed; it was 'Beer by Christmas.' ").
104. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
105. Young's Market Co. v. Board of Equalization, 12 F. Supp. 140, 141-44 (S.D. Cal.
1935). The district court held that Section Two did not exempt state liquor regulations from
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Justice Brandeis, writing for the Court, reversed the lower court.
Although he agreed with the district court that the fee clearly burdened
interstate commerce, 10 6 Justice Brandeis asserted that the Twenty-first
Amendment "abrogated the right to import free, so far as concerns in-
toxicating liquors."10 7 Addressing the equal protection claim, Justice
Brandeis stated, "A classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth." 108 Urged by the
wholesalers to look to past judicial limitations on the Webb-Kenyon Act
in construing Section Two, Justice Brandeis took a strongly absolutist
position: "As we think the language of the Amendment is clear, we do
not discuss these matters."1 0 9
The Court maintained this sweeping view of Section Two in three
later cases which held that Section Two permitted states to discriminate
against imported alcohol without constraint from either the Commerce
Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. ° Almost immediately, how-
ever, the Court began to retreat from this seemingly unlimited grant of
power to the states. It did so not by going behind the language of the
Amendment; instead the Court gave progressively narrower interpreta-
tions to Section Two as new cases arose. Thus, the Court preserved, for a
time, the superiority of state Section Two power over federal commerce
interests in increasingly narrow circumstances.
b. Limiting Section Two: The Through/Into Distinction
While the Court's early decisions appeared to define states' power
under Section Two, in Collins v. -Yosemite Park & Curry Co. 11 the Court
considered the jurisdictional scope of this power. California had imposed
licensing and regulatory requirements on the transportation of liquor
through the state for use within Yosemite National Park. Although it
struck down the regulations, the Court avoided a direct conflict with its
prior Section Two decisions by holding that Collins involved no transpor-
tation into California within the meaning of Section Two because the
the Commerce Clause; it only permitted states to determine whether "intoxicating liquor
should be a lawful subject of commerce within their limits." Id. at 142.
106. Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 62.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 64.
109. Id. at 63-64.
110. Joseph S. Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939) (upheld a "retaliation"
statute by which Missouri made it illegal to import liquor from any state that restricted the
importation of Missouri liquor); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305
U.S. 391 (1939) (upholding a "retaliation" statute which barred liquor imports from those
states that proscribed shipments of liquor from other states); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp.,
304 U.S. 401 (1938) (upholding state law which prohibited importation of liquor of more than
25 percent alcohol content not registered with United States Patent Office but which did not
apply to domestically manufactured liquors).
111. 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
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ultimate destination of the liquor was a national park under exclusive
federal jurisdiction." 2 Thus the Court created the distinction between
tranportation "into" a state and transportation "through" the state.
Although Section Two permitted states to restrict the transportation of
liquor to a destination within their borders, it did not allow them to pre-
vent transportation through their territories to other states.
The through/into distinction, however, did not prohibit states from
exercising any regulatory power over liquor transported through their
borders for delivery in other jurisdictions. In Duckworth v. Arkansas, 
11 3
the Court, recognizing the state's police power interest in preventing di-
version of liquor shipments earmarked for other states to points within
the state, upheld a permit requirement for liquor transportation through
the state."' While the Duckworth majority found the requirement per-
missible under general commerce clause principles, Justice Jackson con-
cluded that the decision could be supported only by relying on Section
Two's grant of power.
1 15
Similarly, in Carter v. Virginia, 116 the Court relied on the state's po-
lice powers to uphold an even more stringent set of regulations on liquor
shipments through the state. As in Duckworth, the Court found no un-
due burden on interstate commerce. 1 7 In separate concurrences, how-
ever, three justices claimed that the regulations could be sustained only
under Section Two. 18 Writing in concurrence, Justice Frankfurter ar-
gued that Section Two permitted a state to prevent diversion into its own
markets of liquor intended for consumption elsewhere, even if the pre-
ventative measures imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce. 9
After Carter it was twenty years before the Court in Hostetter v.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. 120 again confronted Section Two and
the through/into distinction. Idlewild sold liquor to departing interna-
tional airline passengers and loaded the liquor directly onto the cus-
tomer's aircraft for delivery at the end of the flight. The Federal Bureau
of Customs granted a license to Idlewild and supervised its operations.
When the state of New York attempted to close the enterprise for violat-
112. Id. at 538.
113. 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
114. Id. at 393. The Court upheld the permit requirement under the Commerce Clause as
the least restrictive means by which the state could achieve its legitimate interest in preventing
diversion of interstate liquor shipments into intrastate commerce. Id.
115. Id. at 397-99 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson preferred upholding the permit
requirement under Section Two rather than on what he saw to be an expanded notion of state
police power that intruded on the federal commerce power. Id.
116. 321 U.S. 131 (1944). The regulations in Carter required the posting of a bond in order
to transport liquor through the state. Id. at 132-33.
117. Id. at 137.
118. Id. at 139 (Frankfurter, joined by Jackson and Black, JJ., concurring).
119. Id. at 141-42.
120. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
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ing state liquor regulations, Idlewild obtained an injunction against the
state in federal district court.
121
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the injunction. Writing for
the majority, Justice Stewart concluded that the liquor was destined for
ultimate use in foreign countries, rather than in New York.12 2 Accord-
ingly, because the shipments were in effect "through" rather than "into"
the state, Justice Stewart reasoned that the state's section two interests
were not implicated and ordinary commerce clause considerations gov-
erned the decision.123
Justice Stewart also proposed an alternative to the analytic method
that had led the Court to the through/into distinction. Rather than rely
solely on the language of Section Two, Justice Stewart suggested using a
balancing approach to the relationship between Section Two and the
Commerce Clause: "Like other provisions of the Constitution, each
must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the
issues and interests at stake in any concrete case." 124
Some have argued that this statement calls for a balancing of Section
Two interests against Commerce Clause interests whenever the two con-
ffict.1 25 Others have claimed that Justice Stewart advocated a balancing
approach merely to determine whether Idlewild's international airline
sales should be treated as shipments through the state of New York. 126
Justice Stewart probably intended the latter interpretation. The unique
facts in Idlewild-the presence of a federal enclave in the same physical
space as a state facility-required a balancing of federal and state regula-
tory interests. In any event, however, this balancing analysis was clearly
a shift away from the traditional Section Two analysis.
The through/into cases, particularly Idlewild, established that Sec-
tion Two does not insulate a state's prohibition or unreasonable regula-
tion of liquor shipments that pass through the state from the Commerce
Clause. The Commerce Clause, however, permits reasonable exercises of
state police power to prevent diversions of interstate shipments into the
domestic market. While the Court's precedents upheld this state regula-
tory power on the theory that the regulations did not unduly burden
interstate commerce, an additional rationale stemmed from Section Two.
Finally, when a liquor shipment bears characteristics of being both
121. Idlewild Hon-Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 212 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
122. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 329.
123. Id. at 330-32.
124. Id. at 332.
125. See Note, supra note 94, at 1594 ("This language may suggest that the federal-state
relationship should be reexamined in each case in order to balance the respective interests of
the commerce clause and the twenty-first amendment.").
126. Note, The Evolving Scope of State Power Under the Twenty-First Amendment: The
1964 Liquor Cases, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 759, 772 (1965) (balancing was necessary here be-
cause transaction involved elements of both "through" and "into" shipment).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
"through" and "into" a state, the court will balance the state and federal
interests to determine whether the transaction should be deemed a
"through" shipment. Significantly, the analytic touchstone in all of these
cases was the language of Section Two.
c. Limiting Section Two: The Definition of Peripheral Issues
After the more or less geographical limitation on Section Two cre-
ated by the through/into distinction, the Court limited Section Two fur-
ther by establishing federal authority over "peripheral" aspects of state
liquor regulation.127 In California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,2 ' the Court considered a California wine pric-
ing law that required all wine producers, wholesalers and rectifiers to file
fair trade contracts or price schedules with the state. 129 The state
charged that Midcal sold wine at a price below the applicable price
guideline.130 Midcal asserted that California's pricing system restrained
trade in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 1 ' The state claimed
that application of the Sherman Act was barred by Section Two. 132 The
Court rejected the state's argument. 133 As in the past, the Midcal Court
"focused primarily on the language of [Section Two] rather than the his-
tory behind it.' 34 Although the Court acknowledged that the state's
power could not be confined literally to the "transportation or importa-
tion"1 35 of liquor, it stressed that its analysis should not "lose sight of the
[section's] explicit grant of authority."
1 36
In Midcal, the Court distinguished between state regulations involv-
ing the importation, sale, or distribution of liquor and regulations that
govern "peripheral"'' 37 aspects of liquor control: "Although States retain
substantial discretion to establish [peripheral] liquor regulations, those
controls may be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate
situations."'13 Thus, the federal antitrust laws limited California's power
127. Note, California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.: Federal
Power Under the Twenty-First Amendment?, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 302 (1981).
128. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
129. Id. at 99.
130. Id. at 100.
131. Id. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), provides that the restraint of inter-
state commerce or trade is illegal.
132. 445 U.S. at 106.
133. Id. at 114.
134. Id. at 106-07.
135. Id. at 107.
136. Id.
137. Note, supra note 127, at 309 ("According to the Court in Midcal, the Commerce
Clause permits the federal government to regulate peripheral aspects of liquor control in ap-
propriate situations.").
138. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110. See also Note, supra note 127, at 309-10 (although the point
is made that the Court recognized a grant by the Twenty-first Amendment of "virtually com-
rVol. 13:361
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to control wine prices.
The Midcal analysis raises the difficult question of whether a regula-
tion concerns the importation, sale, or distribution of liquor or some "pe-
ripheral" aspect of liquor regulation. Some guidance is available from
the Court's decisions.' 39 Midcal itself establishes that a liquor pricing
system does not directly relate to liquor importation, sale, or distribution.
Under Midcal, unless a state regulation directly relates to the importa-
tion, sale, or distribution of liquor, it does not fall within the exemption
of Section Two.
The recent decision in Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp " further devel-
oped Midcal's peripheral regulation analysis. In Capital Cities, the Court
struck down an Oklahoma ban on wine advertising on out of state cable
television programming. The Capital Cities Court found that the state
interest promoted by restricting cable advertising was not sufficiently
close to the core of Section Two power to allow the ban to prevail over
the federal interest in uniform regulation of interstate communica-
tions. 4' The Court relied on the need to "harmonize state and federal
powers within the context of the issues and interests of the state in each
case." 1
42
In more recent cases presenting conflicts between Section Two and
constitutional provisions other than the Commerce Clause, the Court has
more clearly departed from the early absolutist decisions. The Court
dealt with the relationship between the Export-Import Clause 143 and
Section Two in Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling
Co., 44 which involved a challenge to state taxes assessed on liquor im-
ported from outside the United States. The Court rejected the state's
Section Two defense of the tax, reasoning that the specific mandate of the
Export-Import Clause had not been affected by Section Two.' 45 The
Court distinguished the more "generalized authority given to Congress
by the Commerce Clause,"' 46 which underlay the peripheral regulation
plete control" over the importation, sale or distribution of alcohol rather than a blanket recog-
nition of complete control over this area).
139. See, eg., Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694, 2708-09 (1984) (where
the issue was whether "the interests implicated by a state regulation are so closely related to
the powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwith-
standing that its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies"); Young's Market,
299 U.S. 61-64 (license fee for right to ship liquor into state is directly related to importation);
140. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
141. Id. at 2708.
142. Id.
143. Article I, section 10, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall,
without the consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports ...
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
144. 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
145. Id. at 345-46.
146. Id. at 344.
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analysis, from the express prohibition of the Export-Import Clause.147
The Court also dealt with the relation between the Equal Protection
Clause and Section Two in Craig v. Boren. 4 The Court there addressed
a state law that provided a higher minimum drinking age for men than
for women with respect to purchases of beer. The Court declined to fol-
low the flat statement made in Young's Market that a classification recog-
nized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by
the Fourteenth. 49 Instead, the Boren Court distinguished between the
economic discrimination in Young's Market and classifications based on
gender. 
1 50
IV. The Search for a Rationale for Bacchus
A. Critique of the Bacchus Opinions
Justice White, writing for the majority in Bacchus, attempted to de-
fine a central purpose to Section Two which would restrict the extent to
which the exercise of state power over liquor would be immune from the
Commerce Clause. In so doing, he came down on all fours with the
policy of the "federalist" interpretation of Section Two while expressly
disclaiming any reliance on the legislative history of Section Two. Jus-
tice White seemed to base his finding of Section Two's central purpose on
the Court's evolving analysis of Section Two. The connection, however,
is tenuous at best. Justice Stevens, on the other hand, took a firm absolu-
tist stance in his dissenting opinion."'
1. The Majority View
Even though the discriminatory tax violated the Commerce Clause,
Hawaii claimed that Section Two exempted it from commerce clause
constraints.152 Hawaii's claim found considerable support in: (1) the
Court's early absolutist decisions, (2) the through/into cases, because the
liquor was imported for consumption within the state and, (3) the as-
serted corollary to Midcal that, because Hawaii's tax directly related to
the importation of liquor, it fell within the full regulatory power of the
state under Section Two.
To overcome Hawaii's argument, Justice White had either to de-
velop a new line of Section Two analysis or to revise one of the existing
theories to forbid wet states from discriminating against liquor imports.
Under the first alternative, Justice White could have reviewed the legisla-
147. Id.
148. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
149. Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 64.
150. 429 U.S. at 206-08.
151. Bacchus, 104 S. Ct. at 3059-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 3057-58.
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tive history of Section Two. Justice White disclaimed this option, how-
ever, because of the asserted "obscurity of the legislative history" 
15 3 of
Section Two. As evidence of the obscure legislative history, the majority
offered two apparently contradictory statements on the meaning of the
Section from its chief sponsor in the Senate.154 Rather than rely on the
legislative history for its decision, the Court chose the second alternative
and claimed that its recent decisions have limited the scope of Section
Two to forbid a state from discriminating against imported liquor to aid
its own industry. 55 The majority, however, did not use the analytic
method underlying either the through/into distinction or the peripheral
regulation analysis, both of which derive from strict construction of the
wording of Section Two. Instead, Justice White framed the analysis in
Bacchus as a balancing judgment: "whether the principles underlying
the Twenty-first Amendment are sufficiently implicated by [Hawaii's] ex-
emption ... to outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would
otherwise be offended."
1 56
The Bacchus decision did not rest on the through/into distinc-
tion.157 The liquor subject to the excise tax was imported into Hawaii
solely for sale and consumption within the state. There was no passage
through the state within the meaning of the distinction established in
Collins, Duckworth, or even Idlewild. Justice White relied on Idlewild for
the proposition that the Twenty-first Amendment did not "operat[e] to
'repeal' the Commerce Clause." ' However, that language from
Idlewild refers to federal power over liquor moving through the state, not
to liquor transported into the state.159
Similarly, the Bacchus decision does not follow from the peripheral
regulation analysis in Midcal and Capital Cities. That analysis applies
only to regulations that are peripheral to the Section Two power over
liquor importation, sale and use.160 By contrast, a tax levied on liquor
imports, no matter what the motivation, is a direct regulation lying at the
heart of the express grant of power in Section Two. Thus the peripheral
regulation analysis seems misplaced in Bacchus.
153. Id. at 3058.
154. Id. In reporting the view of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Blaie said that
the purpose of Section Two was "to restore to the States... absolute control over interstate
commerce affecting intoxicating liquors ...... 76 CONG. REc. 4143 (1933). On the other
hand, he also expressed a narrower view: "So to assure the so-called dry States against the
importation of intoxicating liquor into those States, it is proposed to write permanently into
the Constitution a prohibition along that line." Id. at 4141.
155. Bacchus, 104 S. Ct. at 3058.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 111-126 and accompanying text.
158. Bacchus, 104 S. Ct. at 3058 (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon-Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324, 331-32 0964)).
159. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 127-142 and accompanying text.
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Despite its assertions to the contrary, the Bacchus Court went be-
yond the Section Two precedents and found a new interpretation of the
meaning of Section Two itself. The majority determined the central pur-
pose of Section Two to be to protect states from "the perceived evils of an
unrestricted traffic in liquor." 161 Clearly, Justice White's discovery of a
central purpose behind Section Two that controls even its express lan-
guage flies in the face of the Court's early absolutist decisions under Sec-
tion Two. 162 Despite this inconsistency, the majority refused to overrule
the early decisions. Moreover, the majority failed to provide a principled
analysis of the source of the central purpose. Although Justice White
claimed that the peripheral regulation decisions supplied the central pur-
pose in Bacchus, those cases cannot provide the Bacchus principle. Con-
trary to the teachings of Midcal, his approach was to balance state
against federal interests regardless of whether the state's regulation lies at
the core of its Section Two power. Even though Justice White disclaimed
any reliance on the history of the Twenty-first Amendment, the legisla-
tive record certainly provides the best rationale for the holding in
Bacchus.
2. The Dissenting View
The dissent tacitly accepted the majority's determination that the
excise tax was a bald encroachment on the Commerce Clause.1 63 The
dissent, however, rejected the majority's analysis of Section Two and re-
turned to the earliest decisions under Section Two, adopting the absolu-
tist interpretation endorsed by the Young's Market Court.' 64 Justice
Stevens acknowledged the through/into limitation but found it inapplica-
ble.165 Finding Hawaii's tax to be a direct regulation of liquor, Justice
Stevens also found the peripheral regulation analysis inapposite. 66 Fi-
161. Bacchus, 104 S. Ct. at 3058. The Court continued: "Doubts about the scope of the
Amendment's authorization notwithstanding, one thing is certain: The central purpose of the
provision is not to empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barriers to com-
petition." Id.
162. See supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. See also Joseph S. Finch & Co. v.
McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305
U.S. 391 (1939); Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401 (1938).
163. 104 S. Ct. at 3062 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (essentially conceding that the liquor tax
exemption in question imposed a burden on interstate commerce that was not shared by local
manufactures, but maintaining that the commerce clause objection was foreclosed by Section
Two).
164. Id. Referring to the Court's decision in Young's Market, Justice Stevens stated that
"the Court explained that the Amendment enables a State to establish a local monopoly and to
prevent or discourage competition from imported liquors." Id. As Justice Stevens noted, this
finding was based on a literal reading of Section Two.
165. Id. at 3060.
166. Id. at 3063-64 (noting that the Capital Cities Cable decision reaffirmed the Court's
view that "a direct regulation 'on the sale or use of liquor' within a State's borders is the 'core
section two power' conferred upon a State").
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nally, the dissent rejected the majority's delineation of a central purpose
behind Section Two that limits its grant of power.
167
Adhering to the Young's Market rationale, Justice Stevens rejected
any attempt to interpret Section Two that went beyond its plain lan-
guage. He argued that an attempt to discern a central purpose in Section
Two "'would involve not a construction of the Amendment, but a re-
writing of it.' "168 Justice Stevens instead embraced the Young's Market
view that the greater power to prohibit liquor within a state, which is
clearly conferred by Section Two, implies the lesser power to selectively
exclude or tax liquor brought into the state.
1 69
Justice Stevens' reasoning has the advantages of simplicity and con-
sistency with the early Section Two precedents. It ignores, however, the
strong federal interest in preventing economic warfare among the states
with respect to interstate commerce. The dissent's view would surrender
control of interstate commerce in liquor to the states, which, as Bacchus
demonstrates, are motivated by parochial economic interests. The dis-
sent also failed to consider that Section Two's grant of power may apply
differently to wet states seeking to selectively regulate liquor imports
than it applies to dry states.
B. An Alternate Rationale for Bacchus
1. The Legislative History
Justice White's opinion in Bacchus took a major step toward re-
dressing the imbalance which has existed between the Commerce Clause
and Section Two since the early absolutist decisions. His reasoning,
however, involved an unsupported leap to the conclusion that a central
purpose underlies Section Two. To fill in the gap left by Justice White's
abrupt repudiation of the Young's Market analysis, it may be helpful to
review the record of the adoption of Section Two and observe how Jus-
tice White might have conducted a more principled analysis.
In debating proposed Section Two, the Senators couched their dis-
cussion of the level of protection it contained for the dry states strictly in
terms of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts. There was no dispute over
whether these two statutes adequately safeguarded the power of dry
states to remain dry. Because the Senators were satisfied with the extent
of the protection already available to dry states, the sole issue concerning
Section Two was whether to constitutionally guarantee the well-defined
167. Id. at 3064. Justice Stevens noted that Young's Market had rejected the proposition
that the "'State may not regulate importations except for the purpose of protecting the public
health, safety or morals."' Id. at n. 15 (quoting State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market,
299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936)).
168. 104 S. Ct. at 3062 (quoting State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U.S. 59,
62-63 (1936)).
169. 104 S. Ct. at 3064.
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protection provided by those statutes. 170 Thus the drafters apparently
assumed that the protection of Section Two would be no greater than the
scope of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts.
During the congressional debate, the drafters of Section Two distin-
guished carefully between the interests of wet and dry states. This dis-
tinction was, of course, implicit in the various references to the cases
involving prior congressional enactments to aid the prohibition efforts of
dry states. 17 ' The distinction was explicit in the remarks of the Sena-
tors.172 Thus it appears that the framers intended Section Two exclu-
sively to protect the interests of dry states and not to benefit wet states.
The framers of the Amendment did not concern themselves with the abil-
ity of wet states to restrict liquor traffic beyond the powers already avail-
able to them to achieve legitimate state regulatory goals under their
ordinary police powers. Rather, the framers viewed the dry states as re-
quiring special protection to guarantee their power to remain dry. It
was, after all, to secure the political support of dry states for repeal that
Section Two was included at all.
Some commentators have suggested that the rejection of proposed
Section Three demonstrated that Congress intended to deny the federal
government any authority over liquor whatsoever. 173 If true, the defeat
of Section Three would support Justice Stevens' absolutist stance in
Bacchus and undermine the majority's conclusion.
The fate of Section Three, however, does not undermine the narrow
reading of Section Two. Section Three, as proposed, was an explicit
grant of power to the federal government to interfere in the internal af-
fairs of the states. 174  Section Two, on the other hand, was merely a
guarantee to the states that an existing power of the federal govern-
170. See supra notes 83-85, 100-101 and accompanying text. Senator Borah, referring to
attacks on state prohibition efforts, said, "All this was sought to be remedied by the Webb-
Kenyon Act, and I am very glad indeed the able Senator from Arkansas has seen fit to recog-
nize the justice and fairness to the States of incorporating it permanently in the Constitution of
the United States." 76 CONG. Rnc. 4172 (1933).
171. See, e.g., 76 CONG. Rnc. 4140 (1933) (remarks of Senator Blaine referring to the his-
tory of congressional enactments on this issue Senator Blaine mentioned cases which involved
total state prohibitions on intoxicating liquors and state efforts at enforcement).
172. See, e.g., id. at 4169-70 (remarks of Senator Borah, referring to the Wilson and Webb-
Kenyon Acts, "[lit never has become a settled policy of the Government or a settled policy of
the Congress and, it seems to me, could not be accepted as a sufficient protection to the dry
states.... Therefore, Mr. President, we are turning the dry States over for protection to a law
which is still of doubtful constitutionality and which, as it was upheld by a divided court,
might very well be held unconstitutional upon a re-presentation of it. Secondly, we are asking
the dry States to rely upon the Congress of the United States to maintain indefinitely the
Webb-Kenyon law.").
173. See, e.g., Note, supra note 94, at 1579 (offering as support for an "absolutist" interpre-
tation of Section Two "the Congressional deletion of a section of the amendment that would
have expressly endorsed concurrent state and federal regulation of liquor").
174. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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ment-protecting interstate commerce-would not be used to thwart the
efforts of states choosing to remain dry. The rejection of Section Three,
therefore, is not inconsistent with a narrow reading of Section Two.
2. The Case Law
The majority opinion in Bacchus suggests that there is an evolving
policy in recent Section Two decisions that supports a narrow reading of
the Section. 7 The majority's precedents, however, do not support the
proposition that there is a limited central purpose for Section Two as it
relates to the states' core powers. 176 On the other hand, some recent
decisions do demonstrate that the Court is willing to limit its original
absolutist interpretation of Section Two by some means other than nar-
row construction of its language. These decisions reveal an analytic shift
away from construction of the language of Section Two to determining
its relation with other constitutional provisions. These precedents lend
some indirect support to the majority's conclusion in Bacchus.
One example of this change in analytic approach appears in the
Court's modem conception of the relationship of Section Two and the
Fourteenth Amendment. When the equal protection claim was raised in
Young's Market, the Court stated flatly, "A classification recognized by
the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Four-
teenth."1 77 In Craig v. Boren,"'8 however, the Court retreated from this
strong position. The Craig Court, in striking down a higher minimum
drinking age for men than for women, distinguished between the eco-
nomic discrimination in Young's Market and gender-based discrimina-
tion. 179 The Court stated that nothing in the history or text of Section
Two supports the proposition that it qualifies the protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment.180 Clearly, Craig diverged from the early absolutist
position.
Another shift away from the absolutist position came in Department
of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co..'"I The constitutional chal-
lenge in Beam Distilling Co. was based not on the Commerce Clause, but
on the Export-Import Clause.'82 The Court held that Section Two did
175. Bacchus, 104 S. Ct. at 3057-59.
176. See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text.
177. Young's Market, 299 U.S. at 64.
178. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
179. Id. at 206-08 (referring to Young's Market and Mahoney, in which equal protection
objections were overruled in the face of Section Two, the Court noted that they "touched upon
purely economic matters that traditionally merit only the mildest review under the Fourteenth
Amendment"). Craig is discussed supra text accompanying note 148-150.
180. Craig, 429 U.S. at 206.
181. 377 U.S. 341 (1964).
182. Id. at 342. Article I, section 10, clause 2 provides: "No State shall, without the Con-
sent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and
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not exempt the state from the constraints of the Export-Import Clause
because Section Two did not repeal the specific prohibition against the
imposition of duties on imports by states. 1 3 The dissent, however, made
the logical argument that, on an absolutist reading, the Export-Import
Clause should be no more exempt from Section Two than the Commerce
Clause: "The Amendment, after all, does not talk about 'foreign' liquors
or 'domestic' liquors; it simply speaks of 'liquors'-all liquors, whatever
their origin."'8 4 Indeed, from the standpoint of the dry states, it is just as
important to restrict the flow of liquor from foreign nations as that from
other states.
Finally, the facts in Capital Cities Cable may offer some support for
the Bacchus majority's conclusion. A major factor in Capital Cities
Cable weighing against the state was the selectivity of its advertising ban.
The ban applied only to cable signals carrying liquor advertising from
out of state. The ban did not prohibit such advertising by other, locally-
produced media.' Although the Capital Cities Cable Court went on to
distinguish regulation of liquor advertising as an indirect liquor regula-
tion lying at the periphery of Section Two, that decision reveals that the
Court may closely scrutinize states' attempts to cloak selective regula-
tions under Section Two.
Conclusion
The implication throughout the adjudication of Section Two has
been, perhaps, that in the rush to restore the legitimate liquor trade, the
legal implications of the provision were not adequately considered. As a
result, Section Two litigation has never been guided by a single concep-
tion of the purpose of the provision. The Supreme Court helped to create
this uncertainty with its early decisions construing Section Two as a
grant of plenary power. Since those decisions, however, the Court has
tried to define limits for Section Two in relation to the Commerce
Clause. By carefully limiting Section Two, the Court until Bacchus re-
mained outwardly faithful to the early decisions while protecting the fed-
eral commerce interests.
Bacchus clearly repudiated the early absolutist interpretation. Fur-
ther, by defining a central purpose for Section Two, Bacchus may have
defined the single rationalizing principle that can guide future adjudica-
tion. Although the Bacchus majority's reasoning is unsatisfactory, its
conclusion-that Section Two does not allow a wet state to unreasonably
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress."
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 10.
183. Beam, 377 U.S. at 344.
184. Id. at 347-48 (Black, J., dissenting).
185. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2708-09.
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interfere with interstate commerce in alcoholic beverages-is firmly
grounded in the history surrounding the adoption of the Twenty-first
Amendment.
By Eric T. Freeman*
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